Mart Kuldkepp

For the democratic world, 2024 has marked an unprecedented election year, with nearly half the global population having already gone to the polls or preparing to do so. In such times, the politicisation of even supposedly settled matters is perhaps inevitable (though who can definitively say which ones are settled?). Support for Ukraine, unfortunately, has become one such political weapon, wielded as a tool of domestic political agitation by illiberally inclined candidates seeking to undermine the liberal consensus that still exists, even in its beleaguered state.

A political weapon of variable success

Depending on the nature of electoral systems, and the prevalent public sentiment, these tactics don’t always succeed. This was shown by the recent elections in the UK, where Nigel Farage’s Reform UK gained just a few parliamentary seats, or in France, where Marine Le Pen’s National Rally was outflanked in the second round. However, an opposing example may well come from the upcoming United States presidential election, where the Republican candidates for president and vice president both clearly oppose even the current level of aid for Ukraine—and indeed take an unfriendly stance towards Europe more generally. Of course, it is worth noting that this sort of sentiment is hardly new in US politics, even if it lay mostly dormant through the latter half of the 20^th century.

If Trump wins, it will probably be thanks to something else

Isolationist propaganda machines are currently in overdrive, striving to deepen defeatist sentiments and portray aiding Ukraine as a burden that America – in their view a weak, failing state – cannot sustain. However, given the stark political polarisation in the United States, the number of true swing voters is limited, and it remains uncertain whether such rhetoric underscoring America’s supposed helplessness and lack of resources will be persuasive enough. If the victory is going to belong to the Republicans, it will probably happen thanks to something else.

More valuable for the Trump party have been their efforts to undermine Democratic morale and to create a self-fulfilling prophecy of impending loss. Every potential asset has been mobilised in the service of this goal, be it the flagrantly made-up stories about Haitian immigrants eating cats and dogs, or the several recent assassination attempts that Trump has survived. Perhaps most interestingly for observers of US politics, the Republicans have recruited a group of allies among tech entrepreneurs who, having accumulated their fortunes, believe that they should now have a say in US politics much the same way as the famed aviator Charles Lindbergh or automotive magnate Henry Ford did during World War II. It’s likely that their names will be remembered with comparable fondness in the future.

No serious alternative to US support

But back to Ukraine. The six-month congressional deadlock over the US aid package, still very much in living memory, remains a stark illustration of where all this could lead. Meanwhile, doubts remain over Europe’s ability to offset a retreating United States until its policy shifts once more, as it is likely to do. Thus, at least in the short term, there is no serious alternative to US support for Ukraine, although that’s not to say preparations should not be made for potential disruptions or even a complete halt in aid. Ultimately, supporting Ukraine serves American national security interests, yet full recognition of this fact has been – and continues to be – a slow and painful process that Russia has exploited and will continue to exploit at the expense of Ukrainian lives.

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Mart Kuldkepp is Professor of Estonian and Nordic History at UCL’s School of European Languages, Culture and Society.

Note: The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and not of the UCL European Institute, nor of UCL.

Photo by visuals on Unsplash.