Kristin M. Bakke
This article forms part a series on perspectives from across UCL and beyond on the changing geopolitical order, and the implications for Europe, the European Union and the EU-UK relationship. Find more articles here.
There have been many dark days in Ukraine over the past three years, but the last four weeks stand out, beginning with US-Russia talks over Ukraine’s future that not only excluded Ukraine but seemed to give Russia major concessions—importantly, on Ukraine joining NATO—before proper negotiations even began. These talks were followed by Trump blaming Ukraine for the war, Zelensky visiting the White House to be rudely told off (and to leave), and the US suspending military aid to Ukraine. On the diplomatic front, things have picked up slightly, but the war goes on. European countries are trying to work together to boost military support for Ukraine (and themselves), including a UK and France-led effort to mobilize a ‘coalition of the willing’ to help enforce a potential ceasefire— despite Russian opposition. The US has resumed military assistance after Ukraine agreed to accept their proposal for a ceasefire. Whether Putin, even after agreeing to a partial ceasefire in a much-publicized phone call with Trump, is really interested in an end to war, or anything but a deal that looks a lot like Ukrainian capitulation, is unclear. US delegates are set to meet separately with Russian and Ukrainian teams in Saudi Arabia next week. Meanwhile, the airstrikes and drone attacks continue.
It looks like we are heading back to a period where the great powers divide the world into spheres of influence without much regard for what ‘ordinary people’ want. But it is ordinary people’s lives that are at stake, so we ought to hear their voices.
Thanks to Ukrainian research institutions such as the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology (KIIS), we have systematic knowledge about what people in Ukraine think (at least in government-controlled areas). In collaboration with KIIS, my collaborators and I have conducted surveys in Ukraine in 2019, 2022, and 2024. Our findings point to three key points. First, Ukrainians have long been divided on whether they see their country as more oriented towards the West or Russia, but Russia’s brutal war has changed this, and more people now than before see their future oriented towards the West. Second, support for negotiations has grown the longer the war has lasted, but any solution that grants Russia control over all the areas it has occupied since 2022 has very limited support or, by extension, legitimacy. Third, Ukrainians have maintained strong faith in continued Western support throughout the war.
The West vs. Russia?
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians have been divided on whether they see their country as more aligned with the West or with Russia, They have been pulled in different directions by politicians both at home and abroad, not least by Putin.
This tug-of-war is about the country’s future but also about its past—about how World War II, Stalin, and the 1932-1933 famine, the Holodomor, are remembered. Despite a good dose of ‘Soviet nostalgia’, many Ukrainians want a future oriented towards the West. That is certainly the case after the Russia’s full-scale invasion and a brutal war. Whether it’s about overall geopolitical orientation or views on NATO and neutrality, Putin’s war has led more Ukrainians to look towards the West. This orientation towards the West cannot be seen in isolation from a strong preference for democracy—and Putin is not a fan of democracy either in Ukraine or at home.
Giving up Territory?
If a proper peace negotiation process do get underway, it will mean compromises. From Russia’s side, it is unclear that they are willing to entertain any. For Ukrainians, the country’s political independence is a red line.
The US has signalled that a peace deal would mean Ukraine ceding territory, with the question now being ‘how much’ and ‘where’. As the war has progressed (and the death toll risen), more Ukrainians are willing to agree to territorial concessions. However, a majority, albeit a smaller majority than at the beginning of the war, want Ukraine to continue fighting until the country’s territorial integrity is restored. When we asked in 2024 if people agreed with the statement “Russia should be allowed to control the territory it has occupied since 2022,” 90 percent disagreed.
An outcome that accepts Russia’s territorial annexations, certainly those since 2022, will therefore have neither support nor legitimacy among Ukraine’s population.
Expectations of Western Support
Ukraine needs Western support to avoid a Russian victory. They need Western support to be able to negotiate from a position of strength. And they will need support in the form of security guarantees to deter future attacks, were Russia to agree to a peace deal. Combined, European countries have provided more support than the United States, but the U.S. remains critical.
We asked people in Ukraine their thoughts about future Western support. Though their optimism had declined from 2022 to 2024, in summer 2024 the majority still believed in that Western support would either increase (19%) or continue at the same level (35%). About a quarter believed it would continue at a lower level and only 13% thought it was unlikely to continue at all.
For three years Ukrainians have fought a war in which they have had faith in Western support. With ‘the West’ as we have known it for the last 80 years in a state of flux (if not disarray), much responsibility now lies with Europe—and whether it can come together to play a leadership role in securing a lasting and legitimate peace.
Kirstin M. Bakke is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations. Focusing on political violence, her research explores how states respond to opposition within their borders, the dynamics of violence in self-determination struggles, post-war state-building and wartime legacies, and geopolitical orientations in Russia’s near abroad. She came to the Department of Political Science at UCL in 2009, where she co-founded the Conflict & Change research cluster. Additionally, she is Chair of the Conflict Research Society (CRS), an associate editor at the Journal of Peace Research, and sits on the editorial board of International Security.
Note: The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and not of the UCL European Institute, nor of UCL.
Featured Image: Picture taken by Anastasiia Krutota on Unsplash
UCL EUROPE Blog 
Leave a comment