The Brexit referendum in 2016 was a one-time event with long-lasting and damaging consequences for the UK. It is tempting to think that another one-time event in the form of a return referendum on re-entry will reverse the damage. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Any re-entry referendum would have to be preceded by negotiations between the EU and the UK. There are voices in Europe saying they would welcome the UK back in the EU, just as there are voices in the UK pushing for that option. But good will is not enough. An agreement to mutual advantage requires that each side believes the other can make a credible commitment not to renege on the terms of that agreement. Can the UK credibly make such a commitment?
‘No parliament can bind its successors’ is a basic principle of the UK constitution. So, just as Brexit could be reversed by an act of parliament and an associated referendum, a decision on re-entry could later subsequently be reversed. Of course, no government, not even the most Europhile state in the EU, can make a political commitment to a ‘perpetual union’ of states in the EU, otherwise there would be no Article 50. But other governments have made a commitment to an ever-closer political union that the UK has resisted.
The UK’s famously flexible political constitution precludes there being a procedural fix to this dilemma. Rather we must look to a political consensus across core political parties. Events may hasten such a consensus, including the retreat of the US from European engagement, the threat of Russian expansionism and the economic challenges of the new world economic order.
Meanwhile, if you are being optimistic, interpret the present UK government’s cautious engagement with the EU as a version on the Monnet method, by which functional integration across a number of policy domains incrementally creates the conditions for political commitment. But let there be no doubt, the fault, dear British, is not in our stars but in ourselves.
Albert Weale is Emeritus Professor of Political Theory and Public Policy,
UCL Political Science.
Note: The views expressed in this post are those of the authors, and not of the UCL European Institute, nor of UCL.
